Forest Perspectives 2. Bangkok, Thailand, and Bogor Barat, Indonesia: FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific and Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), 2005. 30 pp. Available free of charge from www.fao.org/world/regional/rap/ and www.cifor.cgiar.org. ISBN 979-3361-64-6.
This brief booklet represents a long-awaited and vital turning point in the reactions of international and national agencies to the “theory of Himalayan environmental degradation” (THED) and related myths that have been used as a basis for forest policy and watershed management for more than half a century. The fact that it is co-published by FAO makes it especially appropriate. The commitment of FAO is not surprising, considering that this giant of the UN family of institutions actively encouraged the “intrusion” of a number of mountain academics into its establishment of the Mountain Focal Point following the inclusion of Chapter 13 (Mountains) into Agenda 21 during the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992.
The often-quoted 1979 World Bank prediction that “by AD 2000 no accessible forests will remain [in Nepal]” was representative of the catastrophe complex of the period. This view was not only reflected and extended by prominent ecologist environmentalists (eg Myers 1986), but also by powerful central government agencies in India, China, Pakistan, and Thailand. It has remained a standard news media item to the present. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, for instance, went a step further and stipulated that deforestation in the Himalaya was causing the world sea level to rise (21 March 2000). Far more serious, however, have been the logging bans that were imposed over vast areas by the governments of China, India, and Thailand. There is no doubt that the myth of THED is very much alive and is used for what may be inferred as highly dubious political reasons, with mountain minority peoples bearing much of the pain. Blaikie and Muldavin (2004) extend this discourse on the political convenience of THED to recent watershed management decisions in India and China.
The booklet under review explains that Hamilton issued some of the first challenges to the then FAO and World Bank forestry assumptions as long ago as 1985. He referred to the “4 Ms” (myth, misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and misinformation). Thompson et al (1986) produced a hilariously funny yet deadly serious Uncertainty on a Himalayan Scale. The Mohonk Mountain Conference of 1986, organized and chaired by Ives, with Maurice Strong as Honorary Chairman, brought together this mushrooming assault on THED (Ives and Ives 1987). This, in turn, led to the influential Himalayan Dilemma (Ives and Messerli 1989), Himalayan Perceptions (Ives 2004), and Floods in Bangladesh (Hofer and Messerli 2006). Thompson (1995), Forsyth (1996), and Blaikie and Muldavin (2004) have categorized this growing reaction to THED in academia as “the Mohonk Process.” In this context, it is significant that the “process” has seemingly penetrated one of the major UN agencies with the publication of the booklet under review. And the fact that it has received relatively extensive attention in The Economist ([Anonymous] 2005) bodes well for more balanced future discussion beyond academia.
The booklet understandably, and perhaps appropriately, does not propose an outright rejection of THED—that is clearly not its purpose. Nevertheless, it does firmly state the need for serious reconsideration of the forestry–flooding issue, and effectively and authoritatively shaves off several of the frequently employed pro-THED arguments. For instance:
While losses due to flooding have greatly increased over the last hundred years, these are due to the huge increases in population and infrastructure on the flood-plains of the great Asian rivers (Ganges, Brahmaputra, Yangtze, Mekong, etc);
There is no reliable data base indicating that the physical extent of flooding has increased since the 19th century;
Floods have vital positive as well as negative impacts;
“Large-scale reforestation programs, the adoption of soil and water conservation technologies in agriculture, logging bans, and the resettlement of upland people to lowland areas will not significantly reduce the incidence and severity of catastrophic floods” (p 25, emphasis in original).
“Importantly, the habit of blaming upland inhabitants for catastrophic floods of whole river basins must be abandoned” (p 25).
The concluding chapter (Making Rational Policy Decisions) urges that the most effective approaches to reducing damage caused by catastrophic floods require a strong focus on downstream areas and floodplains. While this may appear far too “genteel” for mountain academics, it must be remembered that this is a high-level political arena. I believe that FAO has taken a major stand, and I hope that this will generate discussion within the national political contexts. But as Michael Thompson explained in a personal communication in November 2003, as myths are identified for what they are, vested interests will be tempted to refurbish them, or invent others to replace them. In the context of the Himalaya and the Andes, one fledgling myth, already pushed to initial trial flights, is that global warming is not only leading to elimination of all the snow and ice in the Andes and Himalaya but—through the generation of glacial lake outburst floods (jökulhlaup)—will destroy hundreds of millions of lives and cause billions of dollars in infrastructure damage during the present century. As with THED, there is an element of reality in these notions; but the gross exaggeration, in the long run, may do more harm than good.
